< Previous(viii) Safety Management Manual (SMM) Page Chapter 7. Protection of safety data, safety information and related sources ................................................... 7-1 7.1 Objectives and content ................................................................................................................................... 7-1 7.2 Fundamental principles .................................................................................................................................. 7-1 7.3 Scope of protection ......................................................................................................................................... 7-3 7.4 Level of protection .......................................................................................................................................... 7-5 7.5 Principles of protection ................................................................................................................................... 7-7 7.6 Principles of exception .................................................................................................................................. 7-10 7.7 Public disclosure ........................................................................................................................................... 7-14 7.8 Protection of recorded data .......................................................................................................................... 7-15 7.9 Safety information sharing and exchange .................................................................................................... 7-16 Chapter 8. State safety management ..................................................................................................................... 8-1 8.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 8-1 8.2 State safety programme (SSP) ....................................................................................................................... 8-2 8.3 Component 1: State safety policy, objectives and resources ......................................................................... 8-4 8.4 Component 2: State safety risk management ............................................................................................... 8-13 8.5 Component 3: State safety assurance .......................................................................................................... 8-20 8.6 Component 4: State safety promotion .......................................................................................................... 8-27 8.7 SSP implementation ..................................................................................................................................... 8-29 Chapter 9. Safety management systems (SMS) .................................................................................................... 9-1 9.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 9-1 9.2 SMS framework .............................................................................................................................................. 9-1 9.3 Component 1: Safety policy and objectives .................................................................................................... 9-2 9.4 Component 2: Safety risk management ......................................................................................................... 9-9 9.5 Component 3: Safety assurance .................................................................................................................. 9-17 9.6 Component 4: Safety promotion ................................................................................................................... 9-23 9.7 Implementation planning .............................................................................................................................. 9-26 ______________________ (ix) GLOSSARY DEFINITIONS When the following terms are used in the manual, they have the meanings indicated below. Note.— Where an asterisk appears beside a term, the term has already been defined as such in Annexes and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS). Acceptable level of safety performance (ALoSP). The level of safety performance agreed by State authorities to be achieved for the civil aviation system in a State, as defined in its State safety programme, expressed in terms of safety performance targets and safety performance indicators. Accountable executive. A single, identifiable person having responsibility for the effective and efficient performance of the service provider’s SMS. Change management. A formal process to manage changes within an organization in a systematic manner, so that changes which may impact identified hazards and risk mitigation strategies are accounted for, before the implementation of such changes. Defences. Specific mitigating actions, preventive controls or recovery measures put in place to prevent the realization of a hazard or its escalation into an undesirable consequence. Errors. An action or inaction by an operational person that leads to deviations from organizational or the operational person’s intentions or expectations. *Hazard. A condition or an object with the potential to cause or contribute to an aircraft incident or accident. Risk mitigation. The process of incorporating defences, preventive controls or recovery measures to lower the severity and/or likelihood of a hazard’s projected consequence. Safety. The state in which risks associated with aviation activities, related to, or in direct support of the operation of aircraft, are reduced and controlled to an acceptable level. *Safety data. A defined set of facts or set of safety values collected from various aviation-related sources, which is used to maintain or improve safety. Note.— Such safety data is collected from proactive or reactive safety-related activities, including but not limited to: a) accident or incident investigations; b) safety reporting; c) continuing airworthiness reporting; d) operational performance monitoring; e) inspections, audits, surveys; or f) safety studies and reviews. *Safety information. Safety data processed, organized or analysed in a given context so as to make it useful for safety management purposes. *Safety management system (SMS). A systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountability, responsibilities, policies and procedures. (x) Safety Management Manual (SMM) Safety objective. A brief, high-level statement of safety achievement or desired outcome to be accomplished by the State safety programme or service provider’s safety management systems. Note 1.— Safety objectives are developed from the organization’s top safety risks and should be taken into consideration during subsequent development of safety performance indicators and targets. *Safety oversight. A function performed by a State to ensure that individuals and organizations performing an aviation activity comply with safety-related national laws and regulations. *Safety performance. A State’s or service provider´s safety achievement as defined by its safety performance targets and safety performance indicators. *Safety performance indicator. A data-based parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety performance. *Safety performance target. The State or service provider’s planned or intended target for a safety performance indicator over a given period that aligns with the safety objectives. *Safety risk. The predicted probability and severity of the consequences or outcomes of a hazard. *State safety programme (SSP). An integrated set of regulations and activities aimed at improving safety. *Surveillance. The State activities through which the State proactively verifies through inspections and audits that aviation licence, certificate, authorization or approval holders continue to meet the established requirements and function at the level of competency and safety required by the State. System. An organized, purposeful structure that consists of interrelated and interdependent elements and components, and related policies, procedures and practices created to carry out a specific activity or solve a problem. Trigger. An established level or criteria value for a particular safety performance indicator that serves to initiate an action required, (e.g., an evaluation, adjustment or remedial action). ______________________ (xi) ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ADREP accident/incident data reporting AIA accident investigation authority ALoSP acceptable level of safety performance AOC air operator certificate ATS air traffic service(s) CAA civil aviation authority Cir circular CVR cockpit voice recorder D3M data-driven decision-making Doc document ERP emergency response plan FDR flight data recorder FMS financial management system FRMS fatigue risk management systems GASP Global Aviation Safety Plan HF human factors IAW in accordance with ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization iSTARS Integrated Safety Trend Analysis and Reporting System LOSA line operations safety audit OHSMS occupational health and safety management system OSHE occupational safety, health and environment PIRG Planning and Implementation Regional Group QM quality management QMS quality management system RASG Regional Aviation Safety Group RSOO Regional safety oversight organization SAG Safety Action Group SARPs Standards and Recommended Practices SD standard deviation SDCPS safety data collection and processing system SeMS security management system SM safety management SMM Safety Management Manual SMP Safety Management Panel SMS safety management system(s) SPI safety performance indicator SPT safety performance targets SRB safety review board SRBS safety risk-based surveillance SRM safety risk management SSO State safety oversight SSP State safety programme STDEVP population standard deviation TNA training needs analysis USOAP Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme ______________________ (xiii) PUBLICATIONS (referred to in this manual) The following documents are referred to in this manual or may provide additional guidance material. ICAO DOCUMENTS Annexes to the Convention on International Civil Aviation Annex 1 — Personnel Licensing Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft Part I — International Commercial Air Transport — Aeroplanes Part II — International General Aviation — Aeroplanes Annex 8 — Airworthiness of Aircraft Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation Annex 14 — Aerodromes Volume I — Aerodrome Design and Operations Annex 18 — The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air Annex 19 — Safety Management PANS Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) - Aerodromes (Doc 9981) Procedures for Air Navigation Services — Air Traffic Management (PANS-ATM, Doc 4444) Manuals Airport Services Manual (Doc 9137), Part 3 — Bird Control and Reduction Air Traffic Services Planning Manual (Doc 9426) Airworthiness Manual (Doc 9760) Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) (Doc 10004) Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation (Doc 9756) Part I — Organization and Planning Part II — Procedures and Checklists Part III — Investigation Part IV — Reporting Manual for the Oversight of Fatigue Management Approaches (Doc 9966) Manual on Laser Emitters and Flight Safety (Doc 9815) Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) (Doc 10019) Manual on the Competencies of Civil Aviation Safety Inspectors (Doc 10070) Manual on the ICAO Bird Strike Information System (IBIS) (Doc 9332) (xiv) Safety Management Manual (SMM) Manual on Protection of Safety Information (Doc 10053) Part I — Protection of Accident and Incident Investigation Records Safety Oversight Manual (Doc 9734) Part A — The Establishment and Management of a State’s Safety Oversight System Part B — The Establishment and Management of a Regional Safety Oversight Organization Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doc 9284) ______________________ 1-1 Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 WHAT IS SAFETY MANAGEMENT? 1.1.1 Safety management seeks to proactively mitigate safety risks before they result in aviation accidents and incidents. Through the implementation of safety management, States can manage their safety activities in a more disciplined, integrative and focused manner. Possessing a clear understanding of its role and contribution to safe operations enables a State, and its aviation industry, to prioritize safety risks and more effectively manage its resources for the optimal benefit of aviation safety. 1.1.2 The effectiveness of a State’s safety management activities is strengthened when implemented in a formal and institutionalized way through a State safety programme (SSP) and through safety management systems (SMSs) for its service providers. A State’s safety programme, combined with the SMSs of its service providers, systematically addresses safety risks, improves the safety performance of each service provider, and collectively, improves the State’s safety performance. 1.1.3 The SSP is developed and maintained by each State as a structured approach to assist in managing its aviation safety performance. The existing aviation safety record is achieved through a traditional compliance-based approach and should continue to be treated as the foundation of the SSP. As such, States should ensure they have effective safety oversight systems in place. More information on the SSP may be found in Chapter 8. 1.1.4 A State shall require that an SMS is developed and maintained by those service providers under its authority, as identified in Annex 19 — Safety Management, to continuously improve safety performance by identifying hazards, collecting and analysing data, and continuously assessing and managing safety risks (see paragraph 1.2 for details on SMS applicability). More information on the implementation of SMS may be found in Chapter 9. 1.1.5 The ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP, Doc 10004) objectives call for States to put in place robust and sustainable safety oversight systems and to progressively evolve these into a more sophisticated means of managing safety performance. These objectives align with ICAO’s requirements for the implementation of SSPs by States and SMSs by service providers. 1.1.6 This performance-based approach to safety offers improvements as it focuses on achieving the desired outcome rather than concentrating solely on whether a State is compliant or not. It is important to note, however, that the implementation of a safety performance approach is collaborative as it requires effort on the part of the aviation industry to develop appropriate means to achieve the specified outcomes and, with respect to States, to evaluate each service provider’s approach. 1.1.7 Benefits of safety management There are many benefits to implementing safety management, some of which include: a) Strengthened safety culture - An organization’s safety culture can be strengthened by making visible the commitment of management and actively involving personnel in the management of safety risk. When management actively endorses safety as a priority, it is typically well-received by personnel and becomes part of normal operations. 1-2 Safety Management Manual (SMM) b) Documented, process-based approach to assure safety - Establishes a clear and documented approach to achieving safe operations that is understandable by personnel and can be readily explained to others. In addition, clearly defining baseline performance allows controlled changes when continuously improving the safety programme/system, thereby helping the organization optimize resources required to implement change. c) Better understanding of safety-related interfaces and relationships - The process of documenting and defining safety management interfaces can benefit the organization’s understanding of the inter-process relationships, leading to an enhanced understanding of the end-to-end process and exposing opportunities for increased efficiencies. d) Enhanced early detection of safety hazards - Improves the State/service provider's ability to detect emerging safety issues, which can prevent accidents and incidents through the proactive identification of hazards and management of safety risks. e) Safety data-driven decision-making - Improves the State/service provider's ability to gather safety data for the purpose of safety analysis. With some strategic thinking to determine what questions need to be answered, the resulting safety information can aid decision makers, in near real-time, to make better-informed, valid decisions. An important aspect of this decision-making is the allocation of resources to areas of greater concern or need. f) Enhanced communication of safety - Provides a common safety language throughout an organization and industry. A common safety language is a key enabler to the development of a common understanding of the organization’s safety goals and accomplishments. In particular, it provides an appreciation for the organization's safety objectives and its safety performance indicators (SPIs) and safety performance targets (SPTs), which provide the direction and motivation for safety. Personnel will be more aware of the organization’s performance and the progress being made toward achieving the defined safety objectives, as well as how they contribute to the organization’s success. The common safety language enables service providers with multiple aviation businesses to aggregate safety information across organizational entities. It is necessary to support the management of interfaces across the aviation system. g) Evidence that safety is a priority - Demonstrates how management supports and enables safety, how safety risks are identified and managed, and how safety performance is continually improved, resulting in increased confidence by the aviation community, internal and external to the organization. This also results in personnel that are confident about the organization’s safety performance, which can lead to the increased attraction and retention of high calibre staff. It also allows for States and regional safety oversight organizations (RSOOs) to develop confidence in the safety performance of service providers. h) Possible financial savings - May allow for some service providers to qualify for a discount on their insurance premiums and/or a reduction to their workers’ compensation premiums based on their SMS results. i) Improved efficiencies - Possible reduction in the cost of operations by exposing inefficiencies in existing processes and systems. Integration with other internal or external management systems may also save on additional costs. j) Cost avoidance – Through the proactive identification of hazards and safety risk management (SRM), the cost incurred due to accidents and incidents can be avoided. In such cases, direct costs may include: injuries; property damage; equipment repairs; and schedule delays. Indirect costs may include: legal action; loss of business and damaged reputation; Chapter 1. Introduction 1-3 surplus spares; tools and training; increased insurance premiums; loss of staff productivity; equipment recovery and clean-up; loss of use of equipment leading to short-term replacement equipment; and internal investigations. 1.2 SAFETY MANAGEMENT APPLICABILITY State safety management responsibilities are outlined in Annex 19, Chapter 3, and include requiring service providers identified in the SARPs to implement SMS. Provisions related to the implementation of SMSs by service providers may be found in Chapter 4 and Appendix 2 of Annex 19. 1.2.1 SMS applicability 1.2.1.1 The assessment to determine the applicability of SMS for Amendment 1 to Annex 19 was based on a set of criteria. These same criteria are expected to be used periodically by ICAO and the Safety Management Panel (SMP) to reassess the need to extend the applicability to other aviation organizations. Total system safety approach 1.2.1.2 A total system safety approach considers the entire aviation industry as a system. All service providers, and their systems for the management of safety, are considered as sub-systems. This allows a State to consider the interactions, and cause and effects, throughout the whole system. It is often impossible or impractical to build all safety systems the same. Therefore, a primary concern for States and service providers is how to best manage the interfaces between dissimilar interacting systems. 1.2.1.3 When reviewing SMS applicability, the link between service providers who already have an SMS requirement under Annex 19 and other organizations conducting an aviation activity was considered. Application of SMS should reduce the risk of safety gaps or overlaps, not increase safety risk through decreased interoperability. Subcontracting implications 1.2.1.4 For SRM to be effective across service providers it is important to clearly define the responsibilities for the identification of hazards and management of associated safety risks for the entire chain of services within the system, without gaps or overlaps. Where a service provider with an SMS requirement contracts to an organization not subject to SMS, the hazards and safety risks potentially introduced by the contractor are addressed by the SMS of the service provider. This places additional SRM responsibilities on the service provider to ensure they are knowledgeable about the safety risks induced by the activities of their contractor(s). For more information on SRM, see Chapter 2. Safety risk control through regulations 1.2.1.5 States should assess whether the existing legislation and regulations effectively address the hazards entailed by the activity. It could be that existing requirements provide sufficient safety risk mitigation and imposing a requirement for SMS for those organizations not applicable under Annex 19 may not yield substantial safety benefit. 1.2.2 Extension of discretionary SMS applicability 1.2.2.1 The applicability criteria outlined above may also serve as guidance for States when considering an extension of SMS applicability beyond that defined in Annex 19 or the promotion of voluntary implementation. Application of discretionary SMS applicability should be thoughtfully considered. The decision to extend the SMS applicability to sectors or service providers should take into account the safety risks identified in the State and if the Next >